Fresh details contained in the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) country report have revealed that the financial cost of the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme was far more severe than previously disclosed, with total losses exceeding US$1.7 billion in 2025.
The revelation is contained in IMF Country Report No. 26/213, prepared as background documentation for Ghana’s 2026 Article IV Consultation, and raises fresh concerns about the financial sustainability of the Bank of Ghana’s gold acquisition strategy implemented through GoldBod.
The report indicates that the widely publicised US$214 million loss represented only a fraction of the programme’s overall financial impact.
According to the IMF, the rapid expansion of the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme in 2025 generated losses exceeding US$1.7 billion, equivalent to approximately 1.5 percent of Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
“Almost entirely related to G4R doré purchases; this amounted to a loss of 17 percent of the value of doré gold sold by the BoG,” the IMF report stated.
Factors Behind the Massive Losses
The IMF attributed the enormous losses to several operational and financial factors, including:
- Service and assay fees paid to GoldBod.
- Discounts offered on gold sold to off-takers and exporters.
- Exchange-rate losses arising from the difference between the higher foreign exchange bureau rate used to purchase gold and the lower Bank of Ghana reference rate used for accounting purposes.
The report also observed that prices paid to Ghana’s Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector are among the highest in the region, further increasing the programme’s cost.
Balance Sheet Under Pressure
Although the IMF noted that part of the reported accounting losses reflects valuation effects rather than direct economic losses, it warned that the programme has significantly weakened the Bank of Ghana’s financial position.
According to the Fund, the losses effectively represent transfers to recipients of foreign exchange at the official reference rate, whether through the Bank’s reserve accumulation or foreign exchange sales.
The report further disclosed that additional losses arose from Gold-for-Reserves-related claims on BOST, portions of which had to be written off during the year.
As a consequence, the IMF reported that the Bank of Ghana’s negative equity had reached 6.7 percent of GDP by the end of 2025, highlighting the mounting financial strain on the central bank.
Growing Questions Over the Programme
The IMF’s latest findings are likely to intensify public scrutiny of the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme and GoldBod’s operations.
The disclosure raises critical questions over the cost-effectiveness of the strategy, the pricing model used to procure gold, and the broader implications for Ghana’s fiscal and monetary stability at a time when the central bank is already grappling with a weakened balance sheet.
The report also underscores the importance of strengthening transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s gold reserves and foreign exchange policies, particularly as the country seeks to safeguard macroeconomic stability and rebuild confidence in its financial institutions.
